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ABSTRACT
This paper investigates catastrophe risk for South African life insurers by considering the additional 
deaths that could arise from a 1-in-200 year mortality shock. Existing South African academic research 
on catastrophic risk has mostly focused on property losses and the resulting impact on property 
insurance companies. Life catastrophe risks have not been extensively modelled in a South African 
context. Local research would be beneficial in terms of quantifying these catastrophic risks for South 
African life insurers, and would assist firms when assessing their own catastrophe mortality solvency 
requirements under the new Solvency Assessment and Management (SAM) regime by providing a 
summary of data relating to various past catastrophes.
 In this paper we model a wide range of catastrophes to assess such mortality risk faced by life 
insurance companies in South Africa. An extensive exercise was undertaken to obtain data for a wide 
range of catastrophes and these data were used to derive severity and frequency distributions for each 
type of catastrophe. Data relating to global events were used to supplement South African data where 
local data were sparse. Data sources included official government statistics, industry reports and 
historical news reports. Since, by nature, catastrophic events are rare, little data are available for certain 
types of catastrophe. This means there is a large degree of uncertainty underlying some of the estimates. 
Simulation techniques were used to derive estimated distributions for the potential number of deaths for 
particular catastrophic events. The calculated overall shock for the national population was 2.6 deaths 
per thousand, which was lower than the SAM Pillar 1 shock of 3.2 deaths per thousand for the same 
* This paper is available online at http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/saaj.v15i1.3, as well as on the ASSA and 
Sabinet websites, with a full set of appendices, which give detailed historical data of the various 
categories of life catastrophes discussed, and distributions and goodness-of-fit tests. 
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population. It has been found that a worldwide pandemic is by far the main risk in terms of number of 
deaths in a catastrophe and, given that this is the most significant component of catastrophe risk, prior 
research on this risk in an South African context is summarised and revisited.
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 The Solvency II Directive (Council of the European Parliament, 2009) is a principles-
based regulatory regime which will apply to insurers in all 27 European Union (EU) 
member states and is set to be implemented from 1 January 2016. The United Kingdom’s 
Financial Services Authority (FSA)1 describes Solvency II as “[setting] out new, stronger 
EU-wide requirements on capital adequacy and risk management for insurers, with the 
aim of increasing protection for policyholders. The strengthened regime aims to reduce 
the possibility of consumer loss or market disruption in insurance”.2 The Solvency Capital 
Requirement (SCR) is the minimum capital requirement to avoid regulatory intervention, 
while the lower Minimum Capital Requirement (MCR) is the absolute minimum required 
level. The Solvency II Directive (Council of the European Parliament, op. cit.: 51–52) states 
that all quantifiable risks should be included in the calculation of the SCR, and the capital 
requirement for each risk module calculated as the 99.5% (1-in-200 year) Value-at-Risk of 
basic own funds.3 Different classes of risk are divided into modules, which are then further 
divided into sub-modules. Article 104 of the Directive sets out life catastrophe risk as a 
compulsory sub-module of the life underwriting risk module.
1.2 South Africa’s Financial Services Board (FSB) has embarked on establishing a risk-
based supervisory regime for insurers in South Africa that, while taking local circumstances 
into account, is also aligned with Solvency II and meets the EU’s requirements for third 
1 The FSA is now the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) in this context.
2 Background to Solvency II. www.fsa.gov.uk/ about/what/solvency/background, retrieved 
24 February 2013.
3 Basic own funds is defined as the difference between assets and liabilities. The liabilities should 
not include the risk margin of technical provisions and should not include subordinated liabilities 
(EIOPA, 2012: 117).
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country equivalence.4 This regime (Solvency Assessment and Management (SAM)) is set to 
be implemented in South Africa from 1 January 2016.
1.3 When calculating the SCR for each of the risk modules, companies have a choice: to 
use the Standard Formula as set out in the FSB’s Technical Specifications5 and subsequent 
Final Position Papers, or to develop a full or partial internal model. Internal models are more 
appropriate when a company believes that a model tailored to their specific exposures would 
demonstrate a better measure of their risk (Buckham, Wahl & Rose, 2011: 74). This internal 
model would then enable a more accurate calculation of the capital required to cover those 
risks. Both partial and full internal models are subject to tight standards and scrutiny by the 
regulator, and are subject to an approval process by the insurer’s regulator (for example the 
PRA or FSB) before they may be implemented (Council of the European Parliament, op. cit.: 
26). For a more accurate reflection of risk, an insurer may seek to develop an internal model 
for the life catastrophe shock.
1.4 The model behind this research aims to derive an appropriate mortality shock for the 
Standard Formula life catastrophe (CAT) risk sub-module in a South African context. The 
shock is defined as the additional deaths per 1000 policyholders (relative to expected), as a 
result of a 1-in-200 year catastrophic event. The resultant change in basic own funds from 
this shock gives the 99.5% Value-at-Risk (VaR), and hence the capital requirement for this 
sub-module. The SCR for the life catastrophe sub-module is defined as:
  LifeCAT = ΔBOF| life CAT shock
where:
Δ BOF = Change in the value of basic own funds,6 and
 life CAT shock = instantaneous increase of x per thousand to the mortality rates which 
are used in the calculation of technical provisions to reflect the mortality experience 
in the following 12 months where x reflects the number of deaths as a result of the 
1-in-200 life catastrophe shock
The above framework is as laid out in the Technical Specifications documents (FSB, 2013: 
SCR 7.7).
1.5 The aim of this research is to find the number of deaths in South Africa resulting 
from a 1-in-200-year catastrophe event, this figure being converted to deaths per 1000 in the 
4 Solvency Assessment and Management (SAM) Roadmap (2010). www.fsb.co.za/Departments/
insurance/Documents/FSBSAMRoadmap.pdf, retrieved 17 July 2014.
5 South African Quantitative Impact Study version 3 (SA QIS3) (2013).
6 While the default option is to exclude the changes in the risk margin of technical provisions, 
companies can choose to include the change in risk margin (FSB, 2013: SCR 1.2.1).
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mortality shock. An insurer would then use this information to determine the capital charge 
for this sub-module. They would do this by looking at their spread of sums assured and 
determining the expected increase in mortality benefits payable due to the shock. The actual 
calculation of capital charges is beyond the scope of this paper.
1.6 The European Institute and Occupational Pensions Authority's (EIOPA) Technical 
Specifications (2012: 194) suggest a life catastrophe mortality shock of 1.5 per thousand in 
the Standard Formula for EU insurers. This is supported by an epidemiological model which 
showed that the 1-in-200 year influenza pandemic stress for most developed countries is 
 between 1.0 and 1.5 per mille for insured lives (Swiss Re, unpublished). The same study’s 
shock for South Africa was heavier, at around 2.5 per thousand.
1.7 The FSB’s Technical Specifications (FSB, 2013) suggest a catastrophe mortality 
shock that is a function of the underlying mortality rate. The rationale is that HIV-positive 
persons are likely to be more adversely affected by a pandemic than HIV-negative persons. 
The instantaneous increase in mortality due to a catastrophe shock is given by the following 
formula:7
  Mort CAT Shock = 12 * min [max (0.2 * MortRate + 0.105; 0.125); 0.3]/ 1000
MortRate is the exposure weighted average underlying mortality rate per mille per month.
1.8 The above formula produces a shock that varies between 1.5 and 3.6 per mille. One 
of the aims of this study was to investigate the reasonability of the standard formula shock.
1.9 The main aim of this study was to identify and document catastrophe data from 
various sources for insurers wishing to derive their own catastrophe risk model as part of an 
internal (or partially-internal) model.8 However, insurers utilising the standard SAM Pillar 1 
formula need to assess its validity with respect to their own liabilities. Even if insurers choose 
not to derive an internal (or partially-internal) model, the data and methods in this paper 
should provide a useful source and starting point for economic capital calculations.
1.10 The SA QIS3 results indicate that the life catastrophe risk (mortality and morbidity 
combined) is the fifth largest of the life underwriting risks for life insurers in general, 
accounting for 13.4% of the total life underwriting risk capital requirement (FSB, 2015). We 
expect that for insurers focusing on the funeral market this risk will be even more significant, 
given that the SAM Pillar 1 formula is dependent on the underlying mortality rate.
7 FSB Position Paper (v 5) FINAL.pdf (2015). www.fsb.co.za/Departments/insurance/Documents/
Position%20Paper%2062%20(v%205)%20FINAL.pdf, retrieved 15 October 2015.
8 FSB: Internal model approval process press release. ftp://ftp.fsb.co.za/public/media/
pressrelease21042011.pdf, retrieved 18 August 2013.
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1.11 The general approach adopted has been to fit distributions to past events. This gives 
rise to two general shortcomings. Firstly, no consideration is given to event types that have not 
occurred (at least somewhere in the world) before, thus future risk is underestimated in this 
regard. Secondly, historical data based on the last 100 or 200 years are highly unlikely to be 
sufficiently credible in the tail of the distribution. This gives rise to considerable uncertainty 
in the results which is further compounded by the questionable relevance of past data when 
estimating future risks.
1.12 The research and model results are based on the impact of catastrophes on the national 
population and thus assume that the risk profile and geographic spread of an insurer’s 
policyholders are similar to the general population. The reason for this approach is that there 
is very limited data, even on a national scale, for modelling purposes. This might make the 
results less relevant for insurers with life insurance policyholders concentrated in specific 
regions, in the event of localised catastrophes affecting their target market. However, even 
for these insurers, a countrywide pandemic might affect their policyholders in a similar way 
to the national population. The information and data provided in this paper may be useful for 
such insurers to recalculate a mortality catastrophe shock appropriate to their circumstances. 
The study also does not model impacts per socio-economic group; the appropriateness of this 
is briefly considered in section 3.6.
1.13 War risk (including civil war) has not been included in the study. Wars that have led 
to significant South African deaths in the last 100 years include the second Anglo-Boer War,9 
World War 1,10 World War 211 and the Angola/Namibia war.12 It is very difficult to use past 
information for assessing this risk due to changes in political and social factors that contribute 
to the risk of war, and changes in the methods and weapons used in warfare. The creation of 
supra-national organisations (such as the United Nations) to promote dialogue is one factor 
that could be expected to reduce the risk of such large-scale conflicts impacting South Africa 
in the future. The exclusion of this risk from our study may be a significant omission given 
that most South African insurers do not have war exclusions, although active participation 
in combat is likely to be excluded. Assessing war risk requires a method that gives suitable 
weight to current political and social factors. As this requires a different approach to the risks 
modelled in this study, further research is required for assessing war risk.
1.14 As with war risk, terrorism risk has not been analysed in this study and this could 
be a significant risk, but is unfortunately difficult to quantify. While South Africa has not 
experienced such attacks in the recent past, the risk of extremist groups operating in other 
African countries may in future pose a threat to South Africa. South Africa has been placed 
9 South African deaths include 6000 Boers and 40 524 deaths in concentration camps (League of 
researchers of South African historical battlefields; www.icon.co.za/~dup42/abw.htm).
10 9592 deaths (Commonwealth War Graves Commission, Annual Report 2013–14).
11 11 906 deaths (Commonwealth War Graves Commission, Annual Report 2013–14).
12 1804 SADF deaths 1966–89 (https://sites.google.com/site/sabushwarsite/Home/bushwar-statistics).
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on terrorism alert in recent years, for example following the Kenyan Westgate shopping 
centre attack in September 2013. This risk is of particular concern to insurers with geographic 
concentration of risk, and is considered the second most important key risk to life (group life) 
writers, after pandemics.13 Further research is required for assessing terrorism risk.
1.15 The model assumes that the risk of an influenza pandemic far outweighs, in terms 
of potential deaths, other pandemic risks and hence does not explicitly allow for other 
pandemics. The recent Ebola outbreak in central Africa highlights this limitation, but may 
ultimately lend weight to the validity of the assumption (at the time of writing, there had been 
no Ebola cases reported in South Africa from the outbreak).
1.16 In aggregating the various types of mortality catastrophe risks to derive an overall 
shock, this study assumed that catastrophe events were statistically independent of one 
another. It would, however, be reasonable to expect positive correlation between some 
events, for example, natural events triggering industrial and/or nuclear accidents (such as the 
Japanese tsunami of 2011, which affected the Fukushima nuclear power plant).
2. TYPES OF EVENTS CONSIDERED
2.1 The FSB’s Technical Specifications (FSB, 2013: SCR 7.7) describe catastrophe risk as:
Catastrophe risk stems from extreme or irregular events whose effects are not sufficiently 
captured in the other life underwriting risk sub-modules. Examples could be a pandemic event 
or a nuclear explosion.
It goes on to exactly define the life CAT shock (defined earlier), which refines this catastrophe 
definition to look at instantaneous increases in mortality. The life catastrophe shock can be 
interpreted as a rare event leading to a sudden accumulation of deaths. Here ‘rare’ means that 
the event type itself (or an observed severity level) has not occurred often enough so that its 
effects are captured in underlying mortality data used for calculating reserves.
2.2 The HIV/AIDS pandemic, although a catastrophe to a particular human life, does not 
match the criteria for the mortality catastrophe shock. The reasoning is that AIDS deaths have 
been occurring over a long period and that the disease is now established. A certain number 
of additional deaths each year are therefore expected and can be anticipated. It would be 
reasonable to consider whether an allowance should be made for a strain of disease (currently 
unknown) with similar characteristics to HIV/AIDS developing in the future. However, unless 
this new strain causes multiple early deaths, the life catastrophe shock is not the correct risk 
sub-module to allow for this risk: the life mortality risk module is more appropriate for this 
risk as it should allow for any long-term changes in mortality rates resulting from widespread 
disease and its treatment.
13 www.theactuary.com/features/2012/08/modelling-the-1-in-200-risks/
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2.3 The SAM Pillar 1 correlation between the life catastrophe and life mortality (and 
disability) sub-modules is a (fairly weak) positive correlation of 0.25. This correlation could 
be interpreted as a catastrophe-type event causing an immediate accumulation of deaths, but 
then also a permanent increase in underlying mortality rates. This correlation is therefore 
used when the various shocks for the sub-modules need to be aggregated to form the life 
underwriting risk module.
2.4 A nuclear disaster is a good example of this: those near the plant would suffer severe 
radiation sickness and are expected to die soon after exposure (catastrophe shock), while the 
cohort of individuals exposed to lower doses of radiation may suffer a permanent long-term 
increase in mortality rates (cancer risk). The short-term effects qualify as a life catastrophe 
risk, whereas the longer-term after-effects should be allowed for in the other life underwriting 
risk sub-modules.
2.5 In light of the above definition, and after consideration of many catastrophe types, 
the risks that were modelled included natural hazards (such as floods, earthquakes and 
tornadoes), man-made disasters (including industrial, energy and transportation accidents) 
and pandemic diseases. These event types, together with war and terrorist attacks, appear to 
be the standard mass casualty events modelled in the industry (see for example RMS14 and 
Milliman).15 Terrorism risk is relatively new but, in some countries, a potentially significant 
source of catastrophe risk; for example “9/11” was one of the single costliest life insurance 
events in history, with an estimated $1.5 billion (current dollar terms) in life insurance claims 
(Insurance Information Institute).16 For reasons discussed in Section 1, war and terrorism risk 
have been excluded from the model, and should be considered in future research.
2.6 Kraut & Richter (unpublished) state that perils causing extreme levels of mortality are 
generally low-frequency, high-severity events, and that the characteristics of these perils can 
differ significantly from each other or from usual risks. Hence catastrophic risks fall into the 
lower right or ‘tail area’ of a typical loss distribution. Banks (2005) shares the low-frequency/
high-severity view, stating that catastrophic risk is hard to measure due to its relative 
infrequency. He goes on to state that catastrophes can either be sudden or prolonged.17 Table 
1 summarises Banks’s general classification of catastrophe frequency types. Note how the 
different types have varying degrees of data availability.
14 Mortality-driven risks: Calculating capital requirements for Solvency II (White Paper). www.rms.
com/liferisks/papers, retrieved 23 June 2013.
15 www.milliman.com/uploadedFiles/insight/life-published/pdfs/managing-extreme-mortality-risk.
pdf.
16 Insurance Information Institute (2008): 9/11 and Insurance: the eight year anniversary—insurers paid 
out nearly $40 billion. www.iii.org/press_releases/9-11-and-insurance-the-eight-year-anniversary.
html, retrieved 26 September 2013.
17 Recall the distinction made previously; this report is more interested in sudden catastrophes whose 
deaths fall under life catastrophe rather than the life mortality risk sub-modules.
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2.7 Diers (2009) writes (in the context of general insurance) that natural catastrophes 
clearly involve severe loss potential, and this matter is further complicated by the small 
number of observations we have, so that long “return periods pose a great challenge to 
modelling for most companies”.18 For this reason, Diers suggests using empirical data from 
a time period reaching as far back as possible. However, due consideration should be given 
to whether such old data are still relevant.
TABLE 1. Types of catastrophe events
Description Examples
Non-repetitive Occurs only once in a particular area, 
and can never be repeated in the same 
location to yield the same results
Collapse of a dam in a specific location; 
terrorist bombing of a landmark building
Irregular Does not appear with any degree of 
statistical regularity
Tsunami generated by an earthquake
Regular Characterised by regular (though long 
and gradual) accumulation of forces that 
lead to the triggering of an event
Earthquake on a known fault line; 
volcanic eruption
Seasonal Has the potential of occurring on a 
regular basis in a general location during 
a given time period/season
Hurricanes; floods; droughts
  Source: Banks (op. cit.: 7)
3. DATA & METHODOLOGY
The catastrophes considered were those for which past data and information existed 
that could be reasonably used as the basis for assessing the current risk in South Africa. 
These were floods, earthquakes, tornadoes and pandemics (natural catastrophes), as well as 
industrial and mining, road and rail, commercial airliner and nuclear accidents (man-made 
events). Assessing war and terrorist-related risks requires a different approach that gives 
appropriate weight to current political and socio-economic factors. These risks have been 
excluded from this study and require further research.
3.1 Data
3.1.1 For event types that have the potential to be a South African life catastrophe 
risk, a search for reliable and complete data was made in an attempt to build a comprehensive 
database of relevant past events. In order to increase the statistical significance of results, or 
simply to have enough points to sensibly fit a distribution, data were not necessarily restricted 
to recent events. For example, in order to obtain three (severe) influenza pandemic data 
points, one needs to go back 100 years. Contrast this with road accidents, where many data 
18 Return period is defined as “the expected length of time between recurrences of two natural 
catastrophe events” (Diers, op. cit.). This is the inverse of the frequency. For example, in throwing 
a dice, we expect a 1 with frequency 1/6. The return period is hence (1/6)–1 = 6 (throws).
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points can be accumulated from the last 10 or so years. However, for certain risks, older data 
become less relevant due to fundamental changes in underlying conditions. For example, 
medical advances have altered flu pandemic risk, and better air travel safety has altered the 
risk of fatalities from airliner accidents, which is discussed in section 3.10.
3.1.2 As far as possible official records were used to build the dataset—such as 
Caelum: a history of notable South African weather events by the South African Weather 
Service, or statistics provided by well-respected independent organisations such as the World 
Health Organization (WHO). For smaller or more localised catastrophes, newspaper articles 
were sometimes the only available data source. In this case an attempt was made to verify 
each data point from two independent news sources.
3.2 General Methodology
3.2.1 An annual frequency was estimated for each event type, defined as 
(number of events over period of investigation) / (number of years investigated).19 This is 
the maximum likelihood estimator for Poisson and Bernoulli mean parameters. Since an 
attempt was made to keep the model as simple as possible, a Bernoulli distribution was used 
where appropriate. This assumes a maximum of one event per annum, which is sensible for 
non-repetitive event types, for example, a nuclear reactor meltdown or very low-frequency 
events such as an airliner crash.20 For repetitive event types where more than one occurrence 
per annum is possible (such as road accidents, floods, mining accidents, etc.), the Poisson 
distribution was the natural choice for modelling the number of events per annum.
3.2.2 For each catastrophe type, the following method was used: the historical 
data points were assumed to be observations of independent and identically distributed 
random variables from an unknown distribution, and a probability density function (pdf) 
was fitted to each. This simplifying assumption might not always be valid. For example, 
improvements in medical technology or other advances may have the effect of lowering death 
rates resulting from catastrophe events, while greater population density might increase death 
rates as a pandemic spreads more easily. The resulting severity distribution then represents the 
random variable of the number of deaths from a certain event type, given that an event of that 
type has occurred. A Microsoft Excel add-on (EasyFitXL) was used to fit over 60 different 
distributions, with the best-fit parameters chosen using the method of maximum likelihood 
(i.e. maximising the log likelihood). The program performs three goodness-of-fit tests for 
each distribution: The Kolmogorov–Smirnov, Anderson–Darling and Chi-square tests.
3.2.3 In terms of fit, there was usually a clear best choice: a distribution which 
performed the best on all three statistical goodness-of-fit tests. However, for the purposes of 
this investigation, a good fit in the extremities or tail of the distribution is of most concern. 
19 This was not the case for earthquakes, airliner, and nuclear accidents, where a different method of 
estimating the frequency was used. See Sections 3.4, 3.10 and 3.11 for more detail.
20 While a number of airliner accidents have made headlines in 2014, the trend for a number of decades 
has been a steadily reducing number of accidents. Even for 2014, the Bureau of Aircraft Accident 
Archives show that there were 78 airliner accidents (involving 6 or more passengers) worldwide by 
1 September, compared to 139 in 2013.
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Hence, when comparing distributions, particular attention was given to observations in the 
upper right corner of the QQ-plot.21 Of the better-fitting distributions suggested by EasyFit, 
the distribution with the best fit in this tail area was chosen, even if overall it was not the best 
fitting distribution. Despite this approach, the tails of some of the chosen distributions may 
still not be sufficiently long, given some extreme observations in the data. It is, however, 
difficult to know how much weight to assign to single outlier tail observations at the expense 
of down-weighting data between the tails and worsening the overall fit.
3.2.4 A worst-case scenario or cap on the possible number of deaths for each 
event type was investigated and, where a cap has been used the reasoning and derivation 
behind each figure is provided. Without a cap (where relevant), the model could return values 
that are out of the realms of possibility. For example, it is not possible for an earthquake in 
Cape Town to kill a greater number of people than the actual population, so a cap equal to the 
population was used to keep the model results sensible.
3.2.5 For some of the catastrophe types (pandemic, earthquake, airline, and 
nuclear events), a slightly different method was used—either due to lack of data to fit a 
severity distribution or a better method being available. Where this is the case, an additional 
note on the method has been given.
3.2.6 Over the course of one year, the random variable representing the number 










a compound random variable, where:
Ni = random variable representing the number of CAT events of type i over the year.
Ni = 0,1,2, … where if Ni = 0 then Yi is defined to be zero
Xij= total number of deaths from the j th event of type i
Xi1, Xi 2, … are independent and identically distributed random variables, from a 
certain probability distribution which can be different for each i
Ni and Xi j are independent for j = 1,2, …
Suppose we have m catastrophe types included in our model. Then, the total number of 
deaths over one year from CAT type events can be represented by the random variable Z—the 
convolution/summation of these compound random variables ,  1,2,...,iY i m= . In summary 









21 A QQ-plot is a plot of the empirical quantiles of the observed data against the corresponding 
quantiles from the assumed underlying distribution and provides a graphical representation of the 
goodness of fit.
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In the model, the Ni’s are all assumed to be either Bernoulli or Poisson random variables. 
The maximum likelihood estimator for the parameter for these distributions is the sample 
mean. This parameter was investigated separately for each CAT type. For each of the Xi’s, 
the distribution was estimated by fitting a probability density function to historical death data 
from CAT type i.
3.2.7 The above random variable Z is then simulated 500 000 times (by 
independently simulating the Ni’s and Xi’s above). An empirical distribution is thus derived, 
and from this the 99.5th percentile or 1-in-200 year death toll from a catastrophe event(s) is 
derived. Simulation is used because it is not feasible to derive this distribution analytically. 
This figure can be interpreted as an estimate of the total number of population deaths occurring 
in South Africa, due to a 1-in-200 year catastrophic event(s). Assuming these deaths are 
distributed randomly (uniformly) over the population, not being any more or less likely to 
affect an insured life from a specific company,22 we divide the result by 52.98 million (the 
South African population estimate at mid-year 2013, Statistics South Africa)23 and convert 
this to get the additional deaths per 1000 members of the population.
3.2.8 In aggregating the various types of mortality catastrophe risks to derive 
an overall shock, this study assumed that catastrophe events were independent. There may 
be positive correlation between some events, for example, earthquakes and industrial and/or 
nuclear accidents. This aspect should be further researched.
3.3 Floods
3.3.1 Globally, floods are the most widely experienced natural disaster causing 
property damage, economic disruption, and loss of life (Montz & Tobin, 2010). Multiple 
deaths from the flooding of rivers, during and after heavy rains, are not uncommon in South 
Africa. This is evidenced by 48 flood events in the last 57 years causing five or more deaths 
each. The Department of Provincial and Local Government (DPLG)’s National Disaster 
Annual Report 2006/07 states that, of all natural hazards in South Africa, floods have caused 
66% of observed deaths.24
3.3.2 The distinction between riverine and flash flooding is important in assessing 
potential loss of life. The Flood Awareness document by the National Disaster Management 
Centre (DPLG)25 defines riverine flooding as the natural, seasonal flooding of a river, such 
as occurs with the river Nile. Hence it is largely predictable and dwellings are not built in 
the flood plain. For this type of flooding, probabilities of exceeding prior high water levels 
are of interest in the field of extreme value theory. This is in contrast to flash floods which 
occur when “an excessive amount of rain falls during a short period of time, or when large 
22 See Section 7: Recommendations for further research.
23 Mid-year population estimates 2013, released July 2014. http://beta2.statssa.gov.za/publications/
P0302/ P03022014.pdf.
24 DPLG, National Disaster Management Centre: Annual report 06/07. 
www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=85534, retrieved 19 June 2013.
25 DPLG, National Disaster Management Centre: Flood awareness. www.preventionweb.net/
files/7569_SHARPISDRFLOOR120081211164914.pdf, retrieved 05 April 2013.
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amounts of water are released from a dam or blockage in a river” (DPLG).26 These largely 
unpredictable and highly localised flash floods are the cause of high levels of death and 
destruction. It is believed that urbanisation contributes to a flash flooding hazard: instead of 
water infiltrating the ground, the water flows over and around impervious land surfaces and 
concrete structures, increasing human exposure to flash flood hazards and the potential for 
damage and injuries (Coles, 2010). Various factors influence the likelihood and extent of a 
flood. Grobler (unpublished) provides a holistic overview of these factors.
3.3.3 KwaZulu-Natal and the Eastern Cape are the provinces most frequently 
affected by flash flooding. In particular, De Villiers and Maharaj (1994) describe the 1987 
KwaZulu-Natal flood as being amongst the most devastating to have occurred in South 
Africa, resulting in nearly 400 deaths. This was the result of 400–600 mm of rain falling over 
five days in the Mdloti catchment area, immediately following a wetter-than-usual two weeks 
in terms of average rainfall. Another notable disaster was the 1981 Laingsburg flood. Large 
parts of the small Karoo town were destroyed when the banks of the Buffalo River burst. 
With more than twice the annual expected rainfall falling over just one weekend, the volume 
of water in the Buffalo River (which flows through the town) was simply too high. Over 100 
lives were lost27 in this disaster.
3.3.4 All the data used for modelling were local and included each major flood 
event dating back to 1956. The South African Weather Service’s publication Caelum provided 
most of the historical flood data up to 1989, and newspaper articles were used for more recent 
data due to an absence of alternative data sources.
3.3.5 The data show that more than one flood causing multiple deaths can occur 
in a single year in South Africa. A Poisson distribution was thus chosen for the frequency 
distribution. The method of maximum likelihood gives the Poisson parameter λ = 0.83. This 
means that, in the model, 0.83 floods are expected per annum. There was insufficient statistical 
evidence to reject the fitted model, with the Chi-square goodness-of-fit test indicating a 
p-value of 0.267.
3.3.6 A three-parameter lognormal distribution fitted the historical death data 
the best for the severity distribution, with a p-value of 0.8289 on the Kolmogorov–Smirnov 
goodness-of-fit test.
3.4 Earthquakes
Earthquakes involve the travel of elastic, or seismic, waves of energy through the Earth’s rigid 
crust. They result from the sudden liberation of accumulated stress and strain along Fault lines, 
which are planar discontinuities in the crust. Around the world, more than 3,000 seismic events 
occur each year, but few of them are damaging or lethal. However, when major earthquakes 
occur in highly populated areas, they can cause major destruction and death tolls in the 
thousands. — Alexander (2010)
26 DPLG, National Disaster Management Centre: Annual report 06/07, supra.
27 South African History Online: At least 100 people drown in a flood at Laingsburg. www.sahistory.
org.za/dated-event/least-100-people-drown-flood-laingsburg, retrieved 19 June 2013.
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3.4.1 In terms of loss of life, the risk is substantial: the 7.5 magnitude (M)28 
earthquake that hit China in 1976 resulted in 255 000 deaths. In Swiss RE’s 2013 Sigma29 
report over half of the 40 worst (in terms of loss of life) catastrophes from 1970 to 2013 
were earthquakes. The potential death toll from a future earthquake disaster in a city such as 
Tehran, with three geological fault lines running through the urban centre, has been estimated 
at between 400 000 and 3.4 million people (Alexander, op. cit.). From this brief introduction 
it might appear that seismic events should count for a large part of any company’s life 
catastrophe SCR. However, past events are concentrated in certain areas, known to be on or 
near geological fault lines.
3.4.2 Research undertaken by Kijko and Visser for Aon Benfield30 suggests that 
Cape Town and Durban are exposed to the highest risk of an event (as these locations have 
experienced the most significant seismic events in South African history). A recent study 
by Kijko, Smit & Van De Coolwijk (2015) provides an estimated assessment of the seismic 
hazard and risk (potential losses) to infrastructure due to a strong seismic event in the Cape 
Town area, and concludes that “seismic hazard is a justifiable concern in South Africa. In 
particular, seismic hazard in Cape Town must be taken into serious account as a potential 
threat to its citizens and to infrastructure.”
3.4.3 Various studies identify the Cape Town area as an earthquake cluster 
area; see for example Singh, Kijko & Durrheim (2009). They do, however, also state that 
no earthquakes have been recorded in the area since instrumental recording began in 1972. 
The area is considered a risk due to the fault line that runs approximately eight kilometres 
offshore of Milnerton, and then cuts almost directly through the Cape Flats. In 1809, an 
earthquake estimated at M = 6.3 occurred on this fault, just 10 km from the present Cape 
Town central business district (CBD). Aon Benfield31 describes the effect on the Cape Town 
CBD of a worst-case scenario 6.87 M earthquake as ‘ruinous’.
3.4.4 Several small earthquakes have been recorded in Gauteng, specifically in 
the mining regions, with a few leading to loss of life in the mines. Singh, Kijko & Durrheim 
(op. cit.) state that while it is difficult to distinguish between natural seismic activity and 
the tremors or blasts from gold and other mining activity, most seismicity originates in the 
gold-mining districts of the Witwatersrand basin. The most recent incident at the time of 
finalising this paper was the earthquake on 5 August 2014 with its epicentre near Orkney, a 
gold-mining town 177 km south-west of Johannesburg. This event measured M = 5.5 on the 
Richter scale according to the Council for Geoscience.
28 Magnitude (M) refers to severity on the moment magnitude scale, which replaced the less accurate 
Richter scale. The two measures are approximately equivalent, except at the upper extreme of 
measurability.
29 http://www.swissre.com/sigma/
30 Aon Benfield (2013). South Africa spotlight on earthquake. http://thoughtleadership.aonbenfield.
com/Documents/201006_mega_eq_report.pdf, retrieved 13 February 2015.
31 Ibid.
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3.4.5 Aon Benfield32 believe that tectonic and mining-related events are largely 
uncorrelated. They point out that the reduction in mining activity in the Gauteng area due to 
depletion of reserves is decreasing the risk of mining-related seismicity.
3.4.6 Singh , Kijko & Durrheim (op. cit.) provide a summary of all seismic events 
in South Africa with M ≥ 5 since 1809, which shows no recorded events in Johannesburg. 
While there have been significant earthquakes (of M ≥ 5) in other mining regions, including 
Carletonville (West Rand), Klerksdorp (North West province) and the Free State, property 
damage and loss of life were mostly limited to these regions. The Carletonville earthquake 
(M = 4.7) of 1992 caused some property damage but no loss of life in Johannesburg. The 
Johannesburg area has therefore been excluded from our model.
3.4.7 Aon Benfield33 believe that for an earthquake (5 ≤ M < 6) to cause damage 
in Durban, the epicentre needs to be less than 45 km away. They estimate the return period for 
this type of event to be 735 years, and the return period for an event (6 ≤ M < 7) to be about 
5 000 years.
3.4.8 Notable South African events include the earthquake that occurred in 
1809— referred to in paragraph 3.4.3—on what is now known as the Milnerton Fault. 
The magnitude has been estimated to be between 6 and 7, which would make it one of the 
largest earthquakes to have occurred in South African history. The greatest structural damage 
occurred near Milnerton itself. There was not much infrastructure built there at that time, 
and eyewitnesses reported the after-effects of the earthquake as fissures along the ground 
(Hartnady, 2003). In 1969 an M = 6.3 earthquake in Ceres caused more than R500 m in 
insured damage34 in today’s terms (Grobler, op. cit.). This event resulted in 12 lives lost and 
many buildings of historical significance damaged in the town of Tulbagh.
3.4.9 Earthquake data (since 1809) summarised by Singh, Kijko & Durrheim 
(op. cit.) have been used to obtain a frequency estimate for M ≥ 5 earthquakes in the Cape 
Town region. Swiss RE’s annual Sigma reports from 2004 to 2012 were used to gather data 
on the number of deaths experienced as a result of earthquakes worldwide. The earthquake 
death counts were segmented into 5 ≤ M < 6, 6 ≤ M < 7 and M ≥ 7, since these were the 
frequencies estimated for Cape Town (see below).
3.4.10 Singh, Kijko & Durrheim (op. cit.) state that the most striking feature of 
the data they have collected is that no earthquake greater than magnitude 6.3 has occurred 
anywhere in South Africa since the 1969 Tulbagh earthquake. They argue that this may either 
be due to crustal pressure being relieved since the 1969 event, or simply that South Africa 
is on a stable continental region, with a long return period (low frequency) for earthquakes 
of this magnitude. Data summarised by Singh, Kijko & Durrheim (op. cit.) show 63 seismic 
events with intensity M ≥ 5 since 1809 in South Africa, with five of those occurring around 
the Cape area. Based on this past data one could expect an earthquake of magnitude greater 
than 5 in the Cape area roughly once in every 41 years (corresponding to an annual frequency 
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
34 R200 m quoted at 1996 price level, assuming 6% inflation year on year, gives R539 m.
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of 0.02451). The same data show that there was one event in the Cape with intensity M ≥ 6 
since 1809 (corresponding to an annual frequency of 0.004878). Grobler (op. cit.) reports the 
South African Council of Geoscience as estimating that Cape Town can expect an earthquake 
of M ≥ 7 once every 500 years (annual frequency 0.002). Frequency estimates for Durban are 
taken from Aon Benfield.35
3.4.11 One approach to modelling earthquake fatalities would be to use existing 
general insurance damage models and then try to link the rand amount of damage to the number 
of deaths. In low GDP countries, insurance penetration is not high, and buildings are not built 
according to stringent standards to be able to resist the impact of earthquakes. Earthquake death 
counts are subsequently very high in these countries, but insured losses low (Gutiérrez et al., 
2005) when compared to an earthquake in a developed country. While buildings in a developed 
country are usually built to a good seismic standard, they would still be damaged by a high 
intensity earthquake, resulting in large insurance losses. However, they would not be expected 
to suffer a full collapse, thereby decreasing a potential death count. While the South African 
Bureau of Standards (SABS) has issued minimum building standards36 to be implemented in 
areas of high seismic risk (including the mining belt covering Gauteng, North West province 
and the Free State, as well as the greater Cape Town region), Davies & Kijko (2003) could 
not establish the extent of adherence to these requirements. Since too few earthquakes causing 
loss of life in South Africa have occurred, a distinct South African death-to-damage ratio could 
not be estimated and the proposed method was abandoned.
3.4.12 The approach when modelling the severity of an event was to use recent 
earthquakes from around the globe as data points. This enables fitting distributions to death 
counts from earthquakes of different intensities, where few earthquakes resulting in casualties 
have occurred in South Africa. Drawing inferences from contingent data can influence the qual-
ity of a model, according to Banks (op. cit.), but is one of the few available options when direct 
data are lacking. For each intensity range (5 ≤ M < 6, 6 ≤ M < 7 and M ≥ 7) of interest, a separate 
severity probability density function was fitted, using death tolls from past global earthquakes 
as data points. Although the numbers vary widely (depending, for example, on location of epi-
centre, size and density of population, building structure codes enforced), the simplified model 
adopted did not attempt to allow explicitly for the location of epicentre and other factors.
 – For the 5 ≤ M < 6 earthquake data (average death count ~23), a Wakeby distribution best 
fitted the data, with a p-value of 0.1358 on the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test.
 – For the 6 ≤ M < 7 earthquake data (average death count ~1208), a Pareto 2 distribution best 
fitted the data, with a p-value of 0.40785 on the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test.
 – For the M ≥ 7 earthquake data (average death count ~20 784), a Frechet distribution best 
fitted the data, with a p-value of 0.43223 on the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test.
3.4.13 Gutiérrez et al. (op. cit.) analysed 300 past earthquakes that had resulted in 
deaths. They consider a high mortality earthquake to be one that results in the death of 15% 
35 Aon Benfield, supra.
36 SABS 0160 1989 (as amended 1990, 1991 and 1993).
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of the population within 50 km of the epicentre. If one assumed the worst possible epicentre, 
a 50 km radius can cover much of greater Cape Town or Durban. Using the 2011 census 
estimates for the city population sizes, this gives a cap of 561 004 deaths for Cape Town (15% 
of 3.74 million) and similarly 516 354 deaths for Durban. For a given year, the magnitude of 
the single most severe earthquake (if any) in each centre is considered. It is assumed that if 
M < 5, then no deaths will result. As discussed above, for Cape Town P(M ≥ 5) = 0.02451 and 
so P(M < 5) = 0.97549 . We also have the points P(M ≥ 6) = 0.004878 and P(M ≥ 7) = 0.002. 
The model then returns, for Cape Town:
 – No fatal event, with probability P(M < 5) = 0.97549
 – A 5 ≤ M < 6 earthquake with probability P(M ≥ 5) – P(M ≥ 6) = 0.019632
 – A 6 ≤ M < 7 earthquake with probability P(M ≥ 6) – P(M ≥ 7) = 0.002878
 – A M ≥ 7 earthquake with probability P(M ≥ 7) = 0.002
The corresponding assumptions for Durban are:
 – No fatal event, with probability P(M < 5) = 0.99844;
 – A 5 ≤ M < 6 earthquake with probability P(M ≥ 5) – P(M ≥ 6) = 0.00136;
 – A 6 ≤ M < 7 earthquake with probability P(M ≥ 6) – P(M ≥ 7) = 0.0002;
 – A M ≥ 7 earthquake with probability P(M ≥ 7) = 0.
Given a 5 ≤ M < 6, 6 ≤ M < 7 or M ≥ 7 earthquake in each of Cape Town and Durban, a death 
count from the respective historical severity distribution was thus drawn.
3.5 Tornadoes
A tornado is a violently rotating column of air in contact with the ground. It usually forms 
under a cumulonimbus (thunderstorm) cloud and is visible as a condensation funnel or by 
the dust and other debris incorporated into the rotation. About 1500 tornadoes are recorded 
annually around the middle latitudes of Earth, and they typically cause 100 to 300 deaths.
— Schmidlin (2010)
3.5.1 Goliger et al. (1997) includes a database of past South African tornadoes 
and resultant casualties and damages. It is clear from this work that tornadoes are present 
in South Africa, with 47 known past events resulting in human casualty. Historically, South 
African tornadoes have occurred in the late afternoon in the summer months. Worldwide, the 
occurrence of tornadoes typically coincides with the annual peak in thunderstorm frequency, 
as this is the period with greatest atmospheric instability (Schmidlin, op. cit.). In the South 
African context, while tornadoes may result in irregular incidents with a few deaths, the 
historical evidence suggests that they do not pose a life catastrophe risk, especially when 
compared to other possible catastrophes. The 1952 Albertynsville (a township near 
Johannesburg) tornado killed 24 people and injured more than 600, destroying 500 houses 
completely (Goliger et al., op. cit.).
3.5.2 Severity data from worldwide tornadoes would not be relevant in determining 
possible South African deaths. Unlike, for instance, industrial accidents, this hazard is very 
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specific to a geographic location, being more severe among the mid-latitudes where the death 
toll is notably higher (Goliger et al., op. cit.). For this reason, South African-only data are 
used, despite being quite limited. The simulations do not make up a large part of the final life 
catastrophe shock, so the following frequency and severity estimates are not critical.
3.5.3 A tornado leading to at least five deaths has occurred on average once 
every ten years in South Africa. A Bernoulli random variable with parameter 0.10 was thus 
used to simulate the number of tornado events per annum.
3.5.4 The deadliest tornadoes in recent decades have occurred in Bangladesh; in 
particular, on 29 April 1989 a tornado struck and killed 1300 people. Casualties arise from 
tornadoes as a result of high winds, flying debris and the collapse of buildings, Schmidlin 
(op. cit.) noting that weak structures offer little protection. This could be a reason for the 
most severe South African incident having occurred in the Albertynsville township. In terms 
of local tornado severity, the log-logistic distribution fitted the data the best, with a p-value 
of 0.96808 on the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test.
3.6	 Influenza	Pandemics
3.6.1 Lloyd’s paper ‘Pandemic: potential insurance impacts’37 notes that much 
of the recent industry focus has been on an influenza pandemic. The WHO states “experts 
at WHO and elsewhere believe that the world is now closer to another influenza pandemic 
than at any time since 1968” (unpublished a), referring to the world as being in an ‘inter-
pandemic’ phase, which stresses the belief that the next pandemic is inevitable. Catastrophist 
Gordon Woo (2011: 43) states that of all possible emerging infectious diseases, “influenza 
stands out as the persistent historical and future human threat”. This is due, he says, to the 
fact that the influenza virus is not eradicable.
3.6.2 As mentioned in section 1, EIOPA ultimately settled on a mortality 
catastrophe shock in the Standard Formula that is in line with the 1-in-200 year influenza 
pandemic scenario modelled by Swiss Re (op. cit.). This would suggest that pandemics are 
the leading life catastrophe risk, or at least are regarded as such by the regulators. RMS38 
modelled life catastrophe events and found infectious diseases to be the main driver behind 
their modelled life catastrophe shock. The reason they give is that the “global footprint” of a 
pandemic leads to a significantly larger susceptible population, compared to a more localised 
event such as an earthquake. Kraut & Richter (op. cit.) share this view, suggesting that, whilst 
terrorism or natural catastrophes depend heavily on proximity to urban areas and coastlines/
earthquake zones respectively, pandemic risk will affect a book of lives more homogeneously 
in terms of location.
3.6.3 Influenza is a virus that attacks the upper respiratory tract. There are three 
types of influenza (A, B and C), of which only two (A and B) cause widespread disease in 
37 Lloyd’s Emerging Risks Team Report (2013). ‘Pandemic: Potential insurance impacts’. 
www.lloyds.com/~/media/Lloyds/Reports/Emerging%20Risk%20Reports/ ER_Pandemic_ 
InsuranceImpacts_V2.pdf, retrieved 17 July 2013.
38 Mortality-driven risks: Calculating capital requirements for Solvency II (White Paper), supra.
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humans. Whereas Type B is only found in humans, Type A is also carried by other mammals 
and birds (“avian influenza”). Subtypes of Type A that are present in birds have the potential 
to cross over to humans when there is close contact between humans and infected birds, for 
example, in poultry markets in developing countries. The possibility of a new strain being 
introduced to the human population as a result of such contact is cause for concern in terms 
of a global pandemic (WHO, unpublished a). The main reservoirs of Type A influenza are the 
vast flocks of birds in China, which are in close contact with large human populations (Woo, 
2011: 43).
3.6.4 The WHO (unpublished a) gives a generic description of how a pandemic 
may evolve. In summary, influenza viruses evolve easily and unpredictably, with influenza 
from one species being able to trade genetic information with influenza from another, in a 
process known as re-assortment. It is when genes between human and animal influenza are 
exchanged that a lethal virus can be created (Woo, 2011). In this way, a new hybrid virus is 
produced, against which humans have no immunity (as it is brand new), and for which no 
vaccines are available. This can result in an unusually severe disease, infecting large numbers 
of people. Such a pandemic could conceivably encircle the globe within three months (WHO, 
unpublished a).
3.6.5 The European Centre for Disease Control and Prevention (ECDC) (un-
published b) says that “by the time it is realised a pandemic has started, the virus is far too 
widely distributed to be constrained”. They go on to say that there is no way of knowing 
when the next pandemic will occur, and that “influenza viruses are inherently unpredictable”. 
 Gunderman and Brown (2007) describe four requirements that need to be met for the next 
full-blown influenza pandemic to occur:
1. A new strain of influenza must emerge.
2.  This disease must be spread to the human population, usually a transmission from birds 
to human beings.
3. The disease must be readily and sustainably transmitted from human to human.
4.  The disease must be capable of causing serious health effects in human beings, witnessed 
by a high case mortality rate.
3.6.6 1918 (H1N1 SpaNiSH Flu)
3.6.6.1 This influenza pandemic, referred to commonly as the “Spanish Flu”, is 
often used as a benchmark or worst-case scenario when measuring pandemic risk (RMS;39 
Lloyd’s40), and is described as “the single most devastating infectious disease outbreak ever 
recorded” (WHO, unpublished a).
3.6.6.2 This unusually severe strain of Type A virus occurred just after World 
War I, and killed more people than the war itself (Woo, 2011: 43). Estimates of the death toll 
vary considerably, but most fall in the range of 30–50 million within the first 12 months of the 
pandemic. For example, the WHO (unpublished a) has the death toll at 40 million, whereas 
39 Ibid.
40 Lloyd’s Emerging Risks Team Report, supra.
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Johnson & Mueller (2002: 115) suggest “of the order of 50 million”, but add that “even this 
vast figure may be substantially lower than the real toll, perhaps as much as 100 percent 
understated”.
3.6.6.3 Johnson & Mueller (op. cit.) estimate excess mortality per thousand lives 
as being between 2.5 and 5.0 for the global population, but with a large variation between 
individual countries. Their estimate for the USA is 6.5 (Swiss Re, op. cit.) puts the USA 
figure at 5.3, whereas South Africa was one of the worst hit countries with an estimated 
mortality rate of 44 per thousand (approximately 300 000 deaths).
3.6.6.4 Whereas it is usually older people and infants that are most at risk of 
developing complications and dying from influenza (Boslaugh, 2008), the Spanish Flu was 
unusual in that at least half of the resulting deaths were of young adults. This is usually attributed 
to the “cytokine storm” effect (see, for example, Swiss Re, op. cit.: 20), an overly aggressive 
response to the virus from the body’s immune system, which can itself lead to respiratory 
problems; and which appears to be more likely in younger, otherwise healthy, individuals.
3.6.7 1957 (H2N2 aSiaN Flu)
This Type A virus originated in China. It arose as a mutation between avian and 
seasonal human viruses (Woo, 2011). It spread through Asia and eventually reached the 
United States. Death toll estimates again vary but most are around two million (Woo, 2011: 
43). It was a milder virus than that of 1918 and the world was better equipped to cope, with 
most excess deaths confined to infants and the elderly (WHO, unpublished a). Swiss Re (op. 
cit.: 28) estimated the excess mortality per thousand lives in the USA to be approximately 0.4.
3.6.8 1968 (H3N2 HoNg KoNg Flu)
This strain began in Asia, and eventually spread to the United States (via troops 
returning from Vietnam) and Europe (WHO, unpublished a). The virus descended from 
H2N2 by antigenic shift, causing up to one million deaths worldwide (Boslaugh, op. cit.). 
Symptoms were milder and mortality lower than the 1957 Asian Flu (again with highest 
mortality in the elderly), with the disease spreading slowly in most countries (WHO, 
unpublished a). The excess mortality per thousand lives in the USA was approximately 0.2 
(Swiss Re, op. cit.: 28).
3.6.9 1997–preSeNt (H5N1)
3.6.9.1 This ongoing strain may well be the next pandemic. The WHO considers 
H5N1 avian influenza a public health concern, going so far as to say it is the strain most likely 
to cause a pandemic. First affecting humans in 1997 in Hong Kong, it has gradually extended 
its reach from Asia to Europe and Africa, having become “deeply embedded” in poultry 
in some countries (ECDC, unpublished b). There is direct human contact with these birds, 
hence the ECDC (unpublished a) stating there is a “constant risk of humans being infected 
and the virus adapting to them”.
3.6.9.2 Boslaugh (op. cit.) writes in the Encyclopaedia of Epidemiology that H5N1 
is not yet capable of causing a pandemic because it is not transmitted efficiently between 
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humans, one of the prerequisites of a pandemic. “The small number of human cases, despite 
tens of millions of poultry infected, over vast geographical areas, for more than two years, 
support this conclusion.” (WHO, unpublished a). However, H5N1 has had a high case 
mortality rate, at over 60%, for those few who have been infected (Lloyd’s).41 It has been 
described by the ECDC (unpublished a) as being a severe disease with high mortality—a lot 
higher than is usually the case when animal influenzas infect humans.
3.6.9.3 At present, having already made the inter-species jump (albeit with 
low rates of human infection), it has met three of the four necessary factors to become a 
pandemic. WHO (unpublished c) says that H5N1 does have the potential to mutate into a 
form more transmissible between humans, which would have it fulfilling the last of the four 
requirements, and so develop into a full blown pandemic. The hope is that if it were to change 
to become more contagious, the virulence would be reduced in the process.
3.6.10 SwiSS re Model
3.6.10.1 The model developed by Swiss Re (op. cit.) appears to be the most 
respected and widely-referenced model for possible influenza pandemics. It is a complex 
epidemiological model that can simulate the progression of a pandemic with a given lethality 
and contagiousness, allowing for demographic characteristics and possible interventions 
(both pharmaceutical and non-pharmaceutical).
3.6.10.2 One advantage of the Swiss Re approach over many of the other attempts to 
model influenza pandemics is that, instead of considering just two or three chosen scenarios, 
thousands of different scenarios can be simulated by randomly drawing the lethality and 
contagiousness parameters from statistical distributions. These distributions have been 
chosen by calibrating the model to historical pandemics, taking into account the changes in 
demographics, medicine and government preparedness over time. By running large numbers 
of simulations, it was possible to attach probabilities to pandemics of differing severity.
3.6.10.3 The model divides the global population into 37 territories (countries or 
groupings of countries) and into 5-year age bands, as a result of which the different effects 
of a pandemic across the age spectrum and between different countries can be modelled. 
The modelled excess mortality (for the general population, but age-weighted to represent 
a typical insurance portfolio) at the 1-in-200 year probability level ranged from 1.0 to 1.5 
per thousand for developed countries and 1.5 to 4.0 per thousand for developing countries 
(approximately 2.5 for South Africa).
3.6.11 The Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Super-
visors (CEIOPS) consultation paper no. 49 (unpublished a) provided the draft advice for 
implementing the standard formula for the life underwriting risk. This paper referenced 
the Swiss Re model in support of the 1.5 per thousand mortality shock that had been used 
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 – Potential weaknesses in the Swiss Re model, i.e. “not adequately allowing for the 
probability of flu jumping across species such as from birds to humans, not allow ing 
for non-influenza pandemics (e.g. AIDS, drug-resistant TB, Ebola virus/MRSA/SARS) 
or other causes of mortality catastrophe such as terrorism or physical catastrophes such 
as earthquakes.”
 – Concerns that “due to sparse historical data on pandemics, there is a significant degree of 
uncertainty around the calibration of any pandemic model”.
 – The fact that “the 1918 flu pandemic, which is the most significant mortality catastrophe 
for which data is available, gave rise to death levels of above 5 per mille”.
3.6.12 In responses to the draft paper (CEIOPS, unpublished b), many companies 
objected to the proposed increase, largely on the basis that the reference to the 1918 
pandemic, seemingly without any consideration for how the world had changed since then, 
was of questionable relevance. Swiss Re themselves refuted the criticisms of their model and 
disagreed with the suggestion that 2.5 per thousand was a better estimate of a 1-in-200 year 
mortality shock. In the end, the final advice document (CEIOPS, unpublished c) reverted to 
1.5, but the concerns raised were kept in the document.
3.6.13 The annual pandemic frequency assumed for our model is 1/30, which 
is the same as that used by Swiss Re (based on the fact that 10 to 13 epidemics have been 
recorded over the last 300 years). Woo (2011: 43) notes that epidemiologists “look to history 
for guidance on the frequency of influenza pandemics, which is approximately every 30 years 
on average”.
3.6.14 It was assumed that the pandemic severity follows the lognormal distribu-
tion (which was the type of distribution chosen for the lethality input parameter in the Swiss 
Re model, although their modelled outputs would not have followed any parametric distribu-
tion). The parameter was then chosen so that the 1-in-200 year shock would be of similar 
magnitude to that modelled by Swiss Re for South Africa (i.e. 2.5 per thousand). It should be 
emphasised, therefore, that the output of the model is obtained with reference to the Swiss Re 
paper and is not an independent verification of the Swiss Re result.
3.6.15 While the simplified “frequency and severity” approach does produce a 
similarly shaped distribution of results to the Swiss Re model, the lognormal assumption 
does not fully replicate the more complex model. For example, when the parameter is chosen 
to give a similar 1-in-200 year result, the 1-in-400 year mortality shock is approximately 3.7 
for this model compared to 4.5 for the Swiss Re model.
3.6.16 otHer ModelS: outSide oF SoutH aFrica
3.6.16.1 The models discussed below typically consider a very limited number of 
scenarios, without attaching probabilities to these scenarios. While this may be helpful to 
establish what a “most-likely scenario” or “worst-case scenario” pandemic might look like, 
neither of those are necessarily of much use in deciding what a 1-in-200 year scenario would 
look like—other than to provide some upper and lower bounds.
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3.6.16.2 RMS42 investigates the likely capital requirements for a UK insurer under 
Solvency II. The catastrophe mortality rate arising from infectious diseases was calculated 
to be 0.9 per thousand for a typical insurer. Sensitivity analysis based on varying company 
characteristics “within plausible ranges”, resulted in the figure ranging from 0.5 to 1.5 per 
thousand.
3.6.16.3 The Society of Actuaries (Toole, unpublished) investigated the potential 
effects of an influenza pandemic on US insurers. They considered a moderate scenario 
(comparable to 1957) and a severe scenario (comparable to 1918). The excess deaths in the 
general population were taken to be 0.7 per thousand and 6.5 per thousand, respectively, 
which were the observed historical rates. It was estimated that the excess deaths for the 
insured population would be 0.4 and 5.0, respectively, per thousand.
3.6.16.4 Moody’s43 also considered a moderate (“1957/1968-like”) scenario and 
a severe (“1918-like”) scenario, but they allowed for the fact that “a virulent 1918-type 
influenza would not be as deadly (today) as it was in 1918”. The estimated excess deaths 
for US insurers were 0.5 and 2.0, respectively, per thousand. Standard & Poor’s44 also 
modelled two scenarios, coming up with estimates of 0.625 and 1.5 for the excess mortality 
per thousand.
3.6.17 otHer ModelS: SoutH aFrica
3.6.17.1 Three papers consider the potential impact of an avian flu pandemic in this 
country, using a multiple-state Markov chain approach.
3.6.17.2 Stipp et al. (unpublished) split the population into 5-year age categories as 
well as by gender, province, AIDS status and rural/urban status for modelling purposes. They 
modelled a mild scenario, a base (severe) scenario, an alternative scenario (the base scenario 
adjusted to allow for the fact that there is a finite limit on the number of general ward and ICU 
hospital beds in the country) and a worst-case scenario (in which the mortality by age was 
assumed to follow a similar pattern to the 1918 pandemic, with significant deaths at younger 
ages). The excess mortality rates (per thousand) estimated for the different scenarios were:
  Mild: 1.3  Base: 15.0   Alternative: 21.0  Worst case: 25.0.
3.6.17.3 The Stipp et al. model was the underlying model used by Dreyer, Kritzinger 
& de Decker (unpublished) in a paper which sought to assess the potential impact of a 
pandemic on the life insurance industry in South Africa.
3.6.17.4 McLaren & Lewis (unpublished) also split the population into 5-year age 
bands and by gender, but unlike Stipp et al. (op. cit.) they then used HIV status (not AIDS 
status) and Living Standard Measures (LSM) categories (not province or rural/urban status) 
to further differentiate the population. In addition to estimating the demographic impact, this 
paper looked at the possible financial cost of a pandemic for the South African life insurance 
42 Mortality-driven risks: Calculating capital requirements for Solvency II (White Paper), supra
43 Bird Flu Risk for U.S. Life Insurers: A Tail Event. Moody’s Investors Service. April 2007.
44 Determining the Insurance Ramifications of a Possible Pandemic. 2005. Proprietary research paper.
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industry in the form of excess claims (for each of individual life, group life and funeral 
cover policies). Two main scenarios were modelled (one equivalent to Asian influenza and 
one equivalent to Spanish influenza), with the effect of HIV and of mortality improvements 
since the time of those pandemics each being quantified under a small number of different 
assumption sets. The excess mortality (per thousand) under the moderate (Asian) scenario 
was modelled to be:
  Base: 1.0 With HIV: 1.0–1.1 With mortality improvements: 0.7–0.9
The excess mortality (per thousand) under the severe (Spanish) scenario was modelled to be:
  Base: 8.6 With HIV: 9.2–10.1 With mortality improvements: 6.7–7.6
3.6.18 Experts are unable to predict with any degree of certainty how severe the 
next pandemic might be, which leads Broekhoven et al. (unpublished) to the conclusion that 
the only possibility is to consider ‘what-if ’ scenarios. Historical pandemics are then obvious 
choices for starting points, as illustrated by the models discussed above, but pandemics have 
been characterised by a widely varying number of deaths (Dawood, Iuliano & Reed, 2012).
3.6.19 The ECDC (unpublished b) state that it is impossible to predict the number 
of people that might be infected by the next pandemic, but assume a 30% population infection 
rate in their pandemic severity index. Infectiousness (which affects the number made ill) and 
lethality (or virulence) together determine the number of pandemic deaths, and for a severe 
pandemic the virus needs to be both fast spreading and highly lethal.
3.6.20 Different countries might well be affected differently. Dawood, Iuliano & 
Reed (op. cit.) say that regional or country differences could be due to differences in access 
to and quality of healthcare, presence of malnutrition or underlying medical conditions, 
age profile of the population and the use or availability of vaccines. They further state that 
estimates from previous pandemics indicate that mortality rates vary significantly between 
countries, quoting a study showing that excess seasonal influenza mortality (for those 65 and 
older) is at least three times higher in South Africa than in the USA.
3.6.21 There are certain factors45 that would make a modern repeat of the 1918 
pandemic less severe: RMS46 suggests a healthier and better informed population, with 
modern treatments more readily available, as mitigating factors. However, other modern 
developments could make a current pandemic more severe. International travel is faster and 
populations more dense, especially in cities, which could hasten the spread of an emerging 
virus. RMS47 concluded that mortality rates would be lower than in 1918. Broekhoven et 
al. (op. cit.) estimate the probability of a pandemic of 1918’s severity being less than 1-in-
400 years. Moody’s48 state that “some experts would argue that the influenza of 1918 is the 
worst pandemic in terms of virulence over the past 500 years, making it a 1-in-500-year 
45 See Lloyd’s Emerging Risks Team Report, supra, for a more comprehensive list of factors, p 8.
46 Mortality-driven risks: Calculating capital requirements for Solvency II (White Paper), supra.
47 RMS (2013). Managing influenza pandemic risk. https://support.rms.com/ /Publications/Influenza_
Pandemic_Risk.pdf, retrieved 10 February 2013
48 Bird Flu Risk for U.S. Life Insurers, supra.
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event”. Swiss Re (op. cit.) go even further, suggesting that “the annual likelihood of an event 
resulting in a general population mortality rate equivalent to 1918 is about 1 in 3000”.
3.6.22 The SAM Pillar 1 catastrophe shock allows for excess mortality varying 
from 1.5 per thousand to 3.6 per thousand, depending on the underlying mortality of the 
insured lives. This raises the question of the appropriateness of assuming that a pandemic can 
have such different effects on different sub-populations in the same country. Most pandemic 
models allow for different excess death rates for different age groups. To the extent that it 
is those age groups with a higher underlying mortality rate, for example, new-borns and the 
elderly, that will be worst affected by a pandemic, it is sensible to suggest that the shock 
should increase as underlying mortality increases.
3.6.23 Both of the South African models mentioned in section 3.6.17 make 
explicit allowance for either HIV-positive or AIDS-sick status, on the assumption that the 
excess mortality as a result of a flu pandemic will be higher for this sub-population than 
for the general population. Research suggests that seasonal flu death rates are significantly 
higher for those suffering from AIDS (Lin & Nichol, 2001).
3.6.24 It is argued by Swiss Re (op. cit.) and Toole (op. cit.) that the excess mor-
tality for the insured population (of a given age) is likely to be lower than that for the general 
population, as a result of the selection effect of underwriting (healthier lives, with fewer 
chronic illnesses) and the socio-economic effect (those who take out insurance are likely 
to have a higher standard of living, perhaps with better nutrition, access to information and 
 access to medical care). The same arguments could presumably be applied to different types 
of insurance policies, since the level of underwriting and the average living standard of 
policy holders would vary between individual life, group life and funeral cover policies.
3.6.25 As a result of the cytokine storm effect, the excess mortality arising from 
the 1918 pandemic did not follow the usual “U-shape” (with most of the deaths being at 
very young or older ages) but rather a “W-shape” with the additional spike arising from 
significant deaths in the 20–30-year-old bracket. It has been noted that one of “the most 
disturbing aspects of the 1918 pandemic” was that it “showed an affinity for young, healthy 
lungs”. (Toole, op. cit.: 17) If this were to be true of a future severe pandemic, it could mean 
that the pandemic hits those with lower underlying mortality even harder than the rest of 
the population. The Swiss Re model (op. cit.: 65) bears this out in that for the 1-in-400 year 
scenario the age bracket with the heaviest mortality is the 25–29 year old bracket.
3.7	 Industrial
3.7.1 Many people working in a concentrated area, often under dangerous 
conditions, can lead to a large number of deaths from the same incident or peril, for example 
the April 2013 collapse of a garment factory in Bangladesh caused over 1000 deaths, hence 
the inclusion of industrial accidents as a possible life catastrophe risk. Note that the large 
accumulation of risk for an insurer providing group life cover to the workers in a single 
factory is not fully captured by the methodology adopted in this paper.
3.7.2 The world in general is seeing a declining number of deaths from industrial 
accidents. A report from the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development 
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(OECD) (2013) lists three main reasons: medical advances offering better treatment to 
those involved in an accident; secondly, a change in industry mix from secondary industry 
to the tertiary sector; thirdly, automation of processes—making intervention by humans in 
otherwise dangerous activities unnecessary.
3.7.3 Woo (2011: 49) recognises this progressive improvement in industrial 
safety standards, but says there is still opportunity for catastrophes, even in the most advanced 
nations. Woo cites human error as one of the most significant contributors to industrial 
risk. He believes there are latent factors which are conducive to an accident, such as lax 
corporate culture, organisational processes or risk management procedures—stating that 
most investigations of past accidents reveal that had one of these latent factors not existed, 
the accident being investigated may well not have occurred.
3.7.4 According to the International Labour Organisation (ILO), South 
Africa’s occupational fatality rate is about 20 per 100 000 people per annum.49 Assuming 
8 million employed, this equates to 1600 people. Whilst this is a large number, it is not as 
a result of a single event and thus cannot be considered a catastrophe using our definition. 
Recall that we are looking at large accidents, resulting in many deaths, rather than the 
aggregate deaths from a large number of independent events. There have not been many 
large industrial accidents in South Africa to date. However, the potential for disaster is 
evident from worldwide data.
3.7.5 To complement direct data from South Africa, mining and industrial 
accidents from Swiss RE’s Sigma reports50 from 2004 to 2013 have been included. The 
data obtained for industrial accidents were under the ‘major fires and explosions’ section. A 
good indicator of the completeness of the report is that Sigma included the Paarl printing fire 
accident in 2009, which resulted in only nine deaths.
3.7.6 The high frequency and severity of accidents in countries such as China, 
Brazil and India may lead one to think that using data from these countries is not relevant to 
South Africa. However, Baskin (2007) produced a table showing that South Africa had the 
highest industrial fatality rate per 100 000 employees compared to any of the BRIC countries. 
Thus, any industrial death data from China, India, Brazil or Russia may be considered relevant 
for estimating accident severity.
3.7.7 There have been 172 large industrial accidents around the world over the 
last 10 years. Five of these occurred in South Africa, which gives a frequency estimate of 
around 0.5 accidents per annum.
3.7.8 A study done by Hamalainen, Takala & Saarela (2006) shows that all the 
key emerging markets have high occupational fatality (and accident) rates compared to more 
developed economies. They state that this is due to a combination of reasons: a lot of work 
still being undertaken in construction and resources (particularly high-risk sectors); weak 
49 International Labour Organisation (2005). Safety in numbers: pointers for global safety culture at 
work. www.ilo.org/public/english/region/eurpro/moscow/areas/safety/docs/safety_in_numbers_
en.pdf, retrieved 18 September 2013.
50 Swiss RE Sigma: Natural catastrophes and man-made disasters. Reports 2004–2013. 
http://media.swissre.com/documents, retrieved 21 March 2013.
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enforcement of legislation; and finally low penalties or compensation for victims’ families. A 
Burr distribution fitted the data the best according to the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test (p-value 
of 0.127).
3.8	 Mining
3.8.1 The National Disaster Management Council (NDMC)51 states that South 
Africa’s deep-level gold mines are among the most dangerous work environments in the 
world, with the death toll this century being estimated between 69 000 and 100 000. They list 
rock falls (the gold is reached by blasting), methane gas explosions and fire as the main death 
hazards.
3.8.2 Mining accidents have been separated as an event type on their own because 
mining is such a large industry in South Africa that the frequency of mining accidents alone is 
still relatively high. Also, an insurer will know whether or not they have exposure to people 
working in mines (for instance by a group life arrangement). This would determine whether 
simulated mining deaths should contribute at all toward the life catastrophe shock.
3.8.3 Historically, the largest industrial disasters in South Africa have occurred 
in the mining sector. In particular, the Coalbrook accident in 1960, due to a partial mine 
collapse and methane explosion, took 437 lives (Van der Merwe, 2006). However, this event 
is not included as a data point, due to improved mining safety standards (NDMC),52 and 
improvements in technology over time. There has been a movement toward improved mine 
safety and an increased sense of corporate responsibility, with the government having set out 
new mining safety regulations (DME).53
3.8.4 The Sigma reports show only two mining events leading to multiple deaths 
in South Africa from 2003 to 2012. Further investigation was deemed necessary, as this 
figure appeared to be too low. Two more events resulting in five or more deaths were found 
over the period of interest (2003–2012), bringing the total events to four over 10 years.54 
The authors suspect that there may have been more mining incidents; but mining companies 
would presumably not wish to encourage news reporting of deaths and national statistics 
are also not readily available. For instance, the website of the South African Department 
of Minerals and Resources has an Accident Statistics section, but the page has been ‘under 
construction’ for at least two years at the time of writing.
3.8.5 Swiss RE’s annual Sigma reports were used to list all mining accidents 
globally since 2003. The vast majority of these occurred in China, and the largest peril was 
gas explosions (at least half of the events). Note that the death counts from these global 
mining accidents are only used to fit a distribution to the number of deaths occurring in a 
51 National Disaster Management Centre: Mine disasters. 
www.ndmc.gov.za/Hazards/Natural/OtherDisasters/MineDisasters.aspx, retrieved 9 April 2013.
52 Ibid.
53 Department of Minerals and Energy: National nuclear disaster management plan. www.info.gov.za/
view/DownloadFileAction?id=124577, retrieved 18 July 2013.
54 The Marikana and other strikes were not classified as mining accidents; they would fall under civil 
unrest which is not included in this report.
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typical mining accident (not for the frequency estimate). This gives a better idea as to the 
shape of the curve, especially the tail of interest, than would a fit to the scarce South African 
data. A four-parameter Burr distribution fitted the data the best, with a p-value of 0.21 on the 
Kolmogorov–Smirnov test.
3.9	 Road	and	Rail
3.9.1 Even though South Africa experiences close to 14 000 road deaths 
annually,55 this in itself is not a catastrophe in a SAM context. Catastrophe risk arises from 
single events that lead to multiple deaths. For example, in the last 15 years there was one 
accident with 51 deaths. This leads one to consider what the 1-in-200 year scenario might 
look like. Consider a full capacity train with multiple carriages (up to 800 passengers) hitting 
a large bus (up to 100 passengers) on a crossing and derailing—an event such as this is within 
the realm of possibility.
3.9.2 Notable past events in South Africa include a commuter train with 800 
passengers derailing near Durban on 9 March 1994. Reports on the death toll vary between 
47 and 63 people. Notable bus accidents include the bus which was driven into a reservoir in 
Bethlehem on 1 May 2003, resulting in 51 deaths by drowning (Swiss RE: Sigma, 2004),56 
and the bus that drove over a bridge into the Westdene Dam on 27 March 1985 causing 42 
children to drown.57
3.9.3 An extensive search was carried out for the most severe South African trans-
port accidents. Unfortunately, whilst Arrive Alive58 or other organisations keeping national 
statistics report total mortality figures on South African roads for a given year, the data are 
not broken down into separate events, so these figures are not helpful. Instead, events were 
investigated one by one, with newspaper articles being the main source. Where possible, Sigma 
reports were used to verify the death data. There were sufficient South African events to use 
local-only data to estimate frequency and severity of road deaths and rail deaths, respectively. 
Road and rail accidents were investigated as separate events. The severity densities will show 
that they represent different distributions. Historically, severe rail accidents have occurred less 
frequently.
3.9.4 On average, there were two reported road events per annum since 1997 with 
five or more deaths. This may appear low; note, however, that the average deaths per accident 
from these events was close to 17, which may indicate that only very severe accidents tend to 
be reported in newspaper articles.
3.9.5 Historically, a severe rail event has occurred on average every four years 
since 1994. A Poisson parameter of 0.25 was used.
3.9.6 A generalised Pareto distribution best fitted the road severity data, with a 
p-value of 0.89 on the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test.
55 Arrive Alive (2009). Road Traffic Report for the Calendar Year 2009. www.arrivealive.co.za/
documents/Year_2009_-_Road_Traffic_Report_-_V2.pdf, retrieved 14 August 2013.
56 Swiss RE Sigma: Natural catastrophes and man-made disasters. Reports 2004–2013, supra.
57 www.westdene1985.co.za, retrieved 22 October 2015. 
58 Arrive Alive (2009), supra.
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3.9.7 A Cauchy distribution best fitted the rail severity data, with a p-value of 
0.98 on the Kolmogorov–Smirnov test.
3.10	 Commercial	Airliners
3.10.1 A commercial airliner crashing with many insured lives on board would 
certainly put stress on an insurer’s reserves. A full-scale crash is at the back of many people’s 
minds when travelling by air, perhaps because an airliner crash is such a dramatic event, 
attracting a great deal of media attention, and not quickly forgotten by the public. This part 
of the research investigates historical frequencies and potential severities for a commercial 
airliner crash to determine how much of a life catastrophe risk this poses for a life insurer.
3.10.2 Past South African events include the 1987 flight SAA 295 Helderberg 
crash. The flight took off from Taiwan but, due to multiple mechanical failures, it crashed 
into the Indian Ocean just before reaching Mauritius, with the loss of 159 lives. There is still 
ongoing controversy about the ‘true’ circumstances of the loss (Young, 2007).
3.10.3 This paper considers relatively recent airline data. Although more data are 
gained by using a longer period, results become less relevant in light of modern air travel 
safety conditions. For example, the Boeing Statistical Summary of Commercial Jet Airplane 
Accidents Worldwide Operations (1959–2011)59 shows a phenomenal improvement in airline 
safety (in terms of accident rates). The 1960 fatality rate was around 35 fatal accidents per 
million departures compared to the 2010 rate of around 1 only. It is also generally agreed that 
the 1950s and 1960s were “not the best period for flight safety when taken in a worldwide 
context” (Young, op. cit.).
3.10.4 Boeing lists their fatal accident rate for scheduled commercial passenger 
operations departures (averaged over 2002–2011 and 174.2 million departures) as 0.34 fatal 
accidents per 1 million departures (i.e. 60 fatal accidents). These figures were based on 
government reports. However, deaths from terrorist activity were excluded (for example, 
the events of 11 September 2001). Including the lives lost in the four “9/11” plane crashes 
increases the fatal accident rate to approximately 0.367 fatal accidents per 1 million departures. 
This figure was used as a baseline estimate for accidents involving planes departing from or 
landing in a South African location. Since this report is interested in loss of South African 
lives, the problem then is to estimate the number of departures from South African airports 
each year. The major drivers of this figure are OR Tambo, Cape Town International and King 
Shaka (KS) airports, with the remaining smaller airports’ total movements roughly equalling 
KS. Combined, these airports experience an estimated 200 000 commercial departures per 
year.60 This leads to a rough estimate of a frequency of fatal accidents per annum departing 
from a South African airport as 0.367*(200 000/1 000 000) = 0.0735 or one fatal accident 
approximately every 14 years.
59 www.boeing.com/resources/boeingdotcom/company/about_bca/pdf/statsum.pdf, retrieved 21 July 
2013.
60 Airports Company of South Africa. 2013. Archives. www.acsa.co.za/home.asp?pid=100, retrieved 
9 August 2013.
SAAJ 15 (2015)
CATASTROPHE MODELLING: SOUTH AFRICAN INSURERS' CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS UNDER SAM | 79
3.10.5 Assuming SAA’s recent accident frequency history is a better representation 
of risk in South Africa, an estimate of SAA’s fatal accident frequency was made. SAA has, in 
its 73-year history, suffered 22 serious accidents, 11 of which were ‘total hull loss’ (Young, 
op. cit.). In light of the aforementioned safety improvements, only the period since 1968 (the 
date of the last major crash prior to the 1987 Helderberg incident) was used as the exposure 
period. A crude estimate based on this 45-year period (1968–2013) is 0.044 incidents per 
annum or one every 22.5 years.
3.10.6 The estimated frequency based on Boeing’s experience is more credible 
due to greater exposure, and hence the estimate of 0.0735 accidents per year was used. A 
Bernoulli distribution with parameter 0.0735 was chosen to simulate whether or not an airline 
incident occurred.
3.10.7 To estimate severity, the types of airliner in the South African Airways 
(SAA) current fleet were investigated. The seating capacity of each airliner was of most 
interest when estimating potential casualties should an accident occur. Drawing an airliner 
capacity at random in the model’s simulations from this fleet assumes that SAA’s fleet is 
a good proxy for all flights departing domestically and internationally from South African 
airports.
3.10.8 Whilst the number of seats on board an airliner is a good indication of the 
maximum number of casualties, the actual number of casualties is likely to be lower. The US 
Department of Transportation61 provides the mean occupancy rate for US flights as 82.52%. 
Assuming this figure for South Africa, the model then assumes a normal distribution centred 
around this figure (limited to between 0 and 100%), with an assumed 10% standard deviation. 
However, not everyone dies in a crash that leads to fatalities. 37% of accidents take place 
on final descent and landing,62 so one can envisage a landing gone wrong causing a high 
number of fatalities but not killing everyone on board. In fact, the Aviation Safety Network63 
did analysis on previous hull loss crash data and found a fatality rate of 76.1% of those on 
board. In addition, deaths outside the plane are also considered. Corresponding to Boeing’s 
4 547 on-board fatalities from 2002–2011, there were 214 (~5%) external fatalities. Each on-
board death toll simulated is thus increased by 5% to allow for this. The resulting (simulated) 
severity distribution displays a bimodal distribution of death counts for all accidents. The two 
peaks are due to the composition of SAA’s fleet; one can almost draw a line between ‘small’ 
or ‘large’ airliner. The normal curve around these two peaks is as a result of the assumed 
normal occupancy distribution.
3.10.9 The model used is based on SAA’s fleet, and the annual number of 
departures from South African airports. In summary, for a given year, the model:
 – simulates whether an event occurred or not, using the previously derived frequency;
61 Bureau of Transportation Statistics: Load factor (passenger-miles as a proportion of available seat-
miles in percent (%)). www.transtats.bts.gov/Data_Elements.aspx?Data=5, retrieved 16 April 2013.
62 Boeing. Statistical summary of commercial jet airplane accidents worldwide operations 1959–2011. 
www.boeing.com/news/techissues/pdf/statsum.pdf, retrieved 21 July 2013.
63 Aviation Safety Network: Boeing 747 statistics. http://aviation-afety.net/database/type/type-stat.
php?type=104, retrieved 22 July 2013.
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 – given an event, randomly chooses an airliner from the SAA fleet to determine the number 
of seats;
 – draws an occupancy rate from the assumed normal distribution (capped at 100%), with 
mean 82.52%;
 – assumes a fatality rate of 76.1% of those on board (Aviation Safety Network64);
 – adds on 5% of that number as external fatalities; and
 – returns the total number of deaths (or zero if no event occurred).
3.11	 Nuclear	Accidents
3.11.1 Africa’s only nuclear power plant, Koeberg, lies around 26 kilometres 
north of the Cape Town CBD. The city has been expanding rapidly, so that close to 300 000 
people are expected to live within a 16-kilometre radius of Koeberg by 2015 (Rontiris & 
Crous, unpublished).
3.11.2 Nuclear reactors operate at extremely high temperatures, and in an attempt 
to regulate the power output, or in the event of an emergency shutdown, a large volume of 
water is needed to cool down the reactor. If this water is not available, it can lead to core 
damage or meltdown. The following events are seen as the most likely causes or triggers of 
loss of coolant (see for example USNRC65; Cohen, 1990): loss of electric power, burst pipes, 
seismic events or human error.
3.11.3 For Koeberg in particular, a threat to the station is loss of sea water cooling, 
so the addition of a large backup water cooling tower is being considered (Koeberg Public 
Safety Information Forum).66 Another threat is seismic activity. Several small earthquakes 
have been recorded from the Milnerton fault, the most recent being in May 2009. Koeberg has 
been built to withstand a nuclear event of 7 Richter—around 9 M.67 Aon Benfield68 estimate 
the upper limit earthquake for this area as 6.87 M. Cohen (op. cit.) provides a summary: “All 
of these accident scenarios lead to a loss of water. The chain reaction cannot go on without 
water, so it is shut down, but one must still worry about heat from radioactivity causing the 
fuel to melt. This can only be prevented if water cooling is very rapidly restored to the reactor 
core (where the fuel is located).”
3.11.4 Nuclear reactors are sealed inside a very robust structure known as the 
containment—more than a metre wide of cement reinforced by thick steel rods. Cohen (op. 
cit.) describes the dual functionality of the containment. Firstly, it protects against external 
forces, such as an airplane flying into it or an explosive device detonated against it; secondly, 
64 Aviation Safety Network: Boeing 747 statistics, supra
65 United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC): Severe accident risks: An assessment for 
five US nuclear power plants (1990). www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1150/
v1, retrieved 8 September 2013.
66 Koeberg Public Safety Information Forum (2012). Minutes of the Koeberg public safety information 
forum (PSIF), 27 September 2012. www.nnr.co.za/wp-content/ uploads/2011/07/PSIF-held-on-27-
September-2012-at-Bulk-Stores-6.pdf, retrieved 18 July 2013.
67 Ibid.
68 Aon Benfield, supra.
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in the case of a meltdown the function of the containment is to hold or ‘contain’ the radioactive 
material. An accident would involve the containment being breached (an unlikely scenario, 
see 3.11.9 below) rather than a more publicly feared ‘mushroom explosion’. Technology 
today is such that an explosion is next to impossible with current safety standards; for 
example, the modifications to Koeberg over the last 10 years have reduced the Core Damage 
Frequency (the likelihood of the core being damaged in an accident) by a factor of about 
ten.69 The worst-case feasible scenario is what is known as a core meltdown, resulting in the 
release of radioactive material: “A very serious emergency at Koeberg could, at worst, result 
in a release of radioactive material. This radioactive material would be blown downwind 
from the station and dispersed” (Eskom Emergency Plan70).
3.11.5 Deaths are more likely to result from radiation poisoning rather than 
from an explosion. The Department of Minerals and Energy (DME)71 classifies radiation 
exposure risks into three time periods: the early phase, where radioactive cloud is the risk; 
the intermediate phase—deposited radioactivity; and the late phase—radioactivity in food 
and water. This research only considers deaths in the early phase, which would contribute to 
a mortality shock over one year. In their severe accident analysis report for US nuclear power 
plants, the USNRC72 also differentiates between the number of early fatalities “expected to 
occur within one year of the accident and the latent cancer fatalities expected to occur over 
the lifetime of the exposed individuals.”
3.11.6 cHerNobyl
A city in Ukraine, Chernobyl, is the site of one of the world’s worst nuclear disasters. 
On 26 April 1986, two explosions at the plant led to the core experiencing a partial meltdown. 
The disaster was the result of unauthorised tests being run while the plant’s cooling system 
was inoperative. The meltdown emitted large amounts of radioactivity into the atmosphere, 
and trace amounts were picked up as far afield as Western Europe and North America. 
According to The Hutchinson Encyclopaedia (2013), the only immediate deaths were the 
31 workers at the plant itself, dying of acute radiation poisoning. However, it is estimated 
that an additional 20 000 to 40 000 cancer deaths will be attributable to this disaster within 
about 60 years from 1986.
3.11.7 tHree Mile iSlaNd
Three Mile Island was the site of a nuclear power plant near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 
in the United States. In March 1979, a “series of mechanical problems, human errors and poor 
decisions” led to a partial meltdown (Chambers Dictionary of World History, 2005). There 
69 Koeberg Public Safety Information Forum (2012), supra
70 Koeberg Emergency Plan (EP) Calendar (2013). www.eskom.co.za/Whatweredoing//
ElectricityGeneration/KoebergNuclearPowerStation/EmergencyPlanning/Pages/Emergency_
Planning.aspx
71 Department of Minerals and Energy RSA (2005): Understanding radioactivity & radiation in 
everyday life. www.gov.za/documents/download.php?f=107435.
72 USNRC: Severe accident risks, supra.
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was no threat to the containment (Cohen, op. cit.), but the event still released dangerous 
radioactivity. Nobody was immediately killed, but the event cast a shadow on the use of 
nuclear energy as an alternative power source.
3.11.8 FuKuSHiMa
On 11 March 2011, a magnitude 9 earthquake occurred off the coast of Japan. This led 
to a tsunami, which subsequently flooded the Fukushima nuclear power plant with seawater. 
Equipment failure led to loss of coolant, and partial nuclear meltdown in three of the six 
reactors, leading to a release of radioactivity. The accident caused no immediate deaths, and 
even the most concentrated areas received very low doses of radiation, so very few cancer 
deaths are expected as a result (WHO, unpublished b).
3.11.9 The United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC)73 has 
general guidelines for core damage frequencies allowable for various degrees of damage. 
According to the USNRC, the “large early release frequency (LERF)” is a good surrogate 
for early fatality risk. Their maximum allowable annual frequency is 10–5, or once every 
100 000 years. In his book The Nuclear Energy Option (1990), physicist Bernard L. Cohen 
neatly summarised two ends of the spectrum of frequency estimates. First, a pro-nuclear 
estimate of the probability of core damage by the USNRC called the “Reactor Safety Study” 
(RSS). Here they estimate a reactor meltdown may be expected around once every 20 000 
years of reactor operation. Second, an anti-nuclear group called the Union of Concerned 
Scientists (UCS) responded with an estimate of one meltdown every 2 000 years, a tenfold 
increase in frequency. An exposure analysis based on available information shows that the 
worldwide experience base of nuclear energy was approximately 10 000 in-service reactor-
years in 2003/4 (Encyclopaedia of Energy, 2004). With approximately 440 nuclear power 
plants in the world, this figure will have risen to approximately 14 000 in-service reactor 
years by 2014. The three historical worldwide core damage events over this exposure number 
yield an estimated frequency of 1/4666 accidents per in-service reactor year. This frequency 
will be used in the model.
3.11.10 A meltdown or core damage does not necessarily imply disaster. The 
containment vessel of thick concrete with supporting steel would still need to be breached, 
and is expected to maintain its integrity for a long time—so in most cases the fatalities should 
be zero (Cohen, op. cit.). Eskom has a warning and evacuation plan to reduce human exposure 
to radiation, should a nuclear event take place. Eskom notes that the population within a 5 km 
radius is the most at risk, but “it is highly unlikely that the entire area within the 16 km radius 
surrounding Koeberg will be affected by a release of radioactive material during a general 
emergency. The radioactive material would travel downwind from the power station”.74 To 
mitigate the effects of a disaster and allow swift evacuation, systems are in place to control 
73 Quantitative guidelines from the framework for risk informing (2002, 10 CHR part 50). 
http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0221/ML022120663.pdf, retrieved 18 July 2013.
74 Koeberg Emergency Plan (EP) Calendar 2013, supra.
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the population density around Koeberg. For example, no development that would lead to a 
population increase is permitted in the 5 km radius zone, and this zone must be capable of being 
evacuated within four hours; whilst development in the 5–16 km zone is permitted, provided 
compliance with the 16-hour evacuation plan can be shown (Jones et al., unpublished).
3.11.11 For the possible outcomes of a core meltdown, the reactor safety study 
estimates given by Cohen (op. cit.) were used. Hence, it was assumed that in 1 out of 5 melt-
downs there would be over 1000 immediate deaths, in 1 out of 100 there would be over 
10 000 deaths and 1 in 100 000 meltdowns there would be approximately 50 000 deaths. This 
assumes that the population density around Koeberg is in line with the average US nuclear site 
investigated in the RSS study. The modelled result was not particularly sensitive to nuclear 
frequency or severity parameters used in the model, and this point was not investigated further.
3.11.12 A worst-case scenario is based on the projected 300 000 lives within the 
16 km zone, and assuming 50 000 of these are within the 5 km radius. A worst case scenario 
(actual breaching of containment/successful terrorist operation) would result in 75% fatality 
of the 5 km zone and 25% fatality of the 16 km zone, giving 100 000 (immediate) deaths.
4. MODEL RESULTS AND SENSITIVITY TESTING
4.1	 The	Overall	Shock
4.1.1 The model shows that an overall 1-in-200 year life catastrophe mortality 
shock for the South African general population is 2.59 additional deaths per thousand people.
TABLE 2. Model results
Upper 99.5% value Additional
South African population deaths 137 304
Deaths per person 0.00259
Deaths per thousand 2.5906
4.1.2 Looking at each catastrophe individually, the (independent) 1-in-200 
events are shown in Table 3.
TABLE 3. Individual shocks
Individual CAT Highest simulated deaths
99.5th percentile deaths
General population 
deaths Deaths per ’000
Pandemic 1 473 000 135 422 2.555
Flood 4 023 813 0.015
Industrial & mining 4 129 717 0.014
Airline 389 267 0.005
Road & rail 1 067 212 0.004
Earthquake 561 004 41 0.001
Nuclear 21 290 0 0
Tornadoes 179 22 0
SAAJ 15 (2015)
84 | CATASTROPHE MODELLING: SOUTH AFRICAN INSURERS' CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS UNDER SAM
4.1.3 The model results show that a pandemic poses the largest life catastrophe 
risk to a life insurer, with the pandemic shock on its own being 98% of the total shock. 
Consequently, the sensitivity of the total life CAT mortality shock will be largely driven by 
the sensitivity of the pandemic shock.
4.1.4 The 2.555 per thousand figure for pandemics, while appearing low relative 
to some of the worst-case scenario projections, exceeds that of the European Standard Formula 
(1.5 per thousand). This is not necessarily unexpected, given that there are differences in 
access to healthcare, HIV prevalence and government preparedness between South Africa 
and the EU countries. In light of the above, this risk is the most important in terms of further 
work and research, the result being highly sensitive to the choice of distribution and the 
assumed annual likelihood of a future pandemic.
4.2	 Sensitivity	Testing
4.2.1 FrequeNcy eStiMateS
A doubling of the frequency of all types of catastrophe other than pandemic was 
carried out. This resulted in almost no change to the final shock: it increased by around 0.8% 
(i.e. 0.02 per mille). While there could be large parameter errors in the frequencies estimated 
(due to using limited data to estimate the 1-in-200-year tail probabilities), the overall result 
is dominated by pandemic risk.
4.2.2 Severity eStiMateS
The model was then tested for sensitivity to the severity estimates for other catastrophe 
types. Here, the severity for all catastrophes other than pandemics was doubled by multiplying 
each death figure drawn from the appropriate distribution by two. Again, the life CAT shock 
showed almost no change, increasing by around 1% (i.e. 0.03 per mille).
4.2.3 paNdeMic paraMeter SeNSitivity
Table 4 summarises the results of multiple scenarios used to determine the sensitivity 
of the overall shock to the assumptions underlying the pandemic section.
TABLE 4. Influenza pandemic parameter sensitivities
Scenario Effect on shock Comment
Doubled the assumed pandemic frequency Increased by ~ 43% to 3.7 Significantly sensitive
Increased mean of lognormal distribution for 
severity by 50%, by changing the spread 
parameter
Increased by ~ 47% to 3.8 Very sensitive
Changed to an exponential distribution for 
severity, with the same mean
Increased by ~8% to 2.8 Moderately sensitive
4.2.4 While the above sensitivities were based on a doubling of parameters, it 
must be emphasised that the level of parameter uncertainty is very high, and that the estimates 
may well be out by multiples in the tail. Apart from scarcity of data in the tail, there is the 
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additional uncertainty of applying past data to future projections—if the underlying risk 
changes over time, historical data are of little relevance.
5. SUMMARY
5.1 SAM requires the study of effects of various shocks on a South African insurer’s 
business. This research calculated a life catastrophe shock for a South African insurer with an 
insured population with similar risk profile and geographic spread as the national population, 
the shock being defined as the additional deaths per thousand people due to an extreme event. 
The application of this excess mortality estimate to determine a company’s solvency capital 
requirement is beyond the scope of this paper.
5.2 A number of potential catastrophe events were investigated. For the event types 
deemed relevant to South Africa, the annual frequency of occurrence and the potential death 
counts per occurrence were estimated. These estimates were derived from historical data, 
using both South African-specific and, in some cases, global data.
5.3 Once these estimates for the frequencies and severities had been derived, potential 
outcomes for future years were simulated using Monte Carlo techniques. Identifying the 
1-in-200 year shock involved determining the 99.5th percentile of these possible outcomes.
6. CONCLUSION
6.1 The model produced a life catastrophe mortality shock of 2.6 additional deaths per 
thousand lives. For an insurer with an insured population similar to the national population 
and experiencing a mortality rate similar to the national mortality rate (of 9.8 per mille75 per 
annum), the SAM Pillar 1 shock is 3.22 per mille, which is higher than the rate suggested 
above. A limitation of this study has been the exclusion of certain risks (in particular, war and 
terrorism) resulting in a potential understatement of the overall catastrophe risk.
6.2 There may be justification for a mortality shock (in particular for pandemic risk) 
that is dependent on the socio-economic profile of the insured population and this should be 
investigated further.
6.3 The results show that pandemic risk is by far the biggest risk. Inclusion of some of 
the risks not considered, for example, war and terrorism, would increase the weight given to 
non-pandemic risks.
75 Statistics South Africa 2011 deaths as a proportion of the 2011 census population.
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6.4	 Underlying	Assumptions	and	Limitations
6.4.1 MaiN aSSuMptioNS
 – Insured lives are exposed to the same non-pandemic catastrophes as the general population, 
hence they are not more or less likely to be affected. (Insured lives may be more exposed 
to certain risks, for example, airliner, earthquake, nuclear and terrorism risks, while being 
less exposed to others, for example, flooding. Even in the insured population the risks are 
unlikely to be the same across all sums insured.)
 – The Swiss Re (op. cit.) model is the most suitable source for quantifying pandemic risk.
 – Catastrophe events are independent from each other.
 – The severity of industrial accidents, mining accidents and earthquake events in South 
Africa (given that one of these events has occurred), is from the same distribution as the 
severity observed worldwide.
6.4.2 liMitatioNS
 – The scarcity of data for catastrophe-type events, which, by their nature are rare, limits the 
credibility of the analysis.
 – Other countries’ catastrophe data, which has been used for some of the event types, may 
be of questionable relevance for South Africa.
 – The effect of all other catastrophes is swamped by the pandemic result, which is itself 
reliant on the suitability of the Swiss Re (op. cit.) model.
 – The exclusion of certain risks (in particular, war and terrorism).
6.4.3 Users of the model should note how sensitive the result is to the choice of 
pandemic severity. All the other catastrophe events could be ignored and the result would not 
be materially affected.
6.4.4 This attempt at deriving the life catastrophe mortality shock is not 
particularly sophisticated. It treats observed past events as being single realisations from 
their respective, and assumed independent, distributions, and then considers the tail of this 
combined distribution. Banks (op. cit.: 68) emphasises that “catastrophe modelling is not 
an attempt to predict when a disaster might occur, but a process that allows users to create a 
meaningful distribution of future events so that associated expected and extreme loss patterns 
can be developed.”
7. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
The approach that was used to model catastrophes is limited in a number of ways. The 
aim of this section is to recommend areas for further research to address these shortcomings 
and to investigate alternative methods for modelling catastrophe deaths.
7.1	 Scenario-based	Approach
This may be the most appropriate approach for hypothesised catastrophes which have 
not yet occurred. It involves constructing possible catastrophe scenarios, and estimating the 
potential loss of life and the proportion of those lives covered by the specific insurer for 
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each scenario. The probability for each event occurring would have to be estimated. This 
method is not as reliant on data as the distribution-fitting approach and involves a degree of 
subjective judgement.
7.2	 Generalising	Catastrophes
Under this method, catastrophes are generalised into one class, with no distinction 
between event types. This is similar to a model developed by Ekheden and Hössjer (2014), 
who used the Peaks Over Threshold model. The frequency of a ‘catastrophe event’ is 
estimated, and a single severity curve for number of casualties is fitted from the pooled 
historical data.
7.3	 Permanent	Total	Disabilities
Taking permanent total disabilities (PTDs) into account could give a better estimate 
of the loss from an event, as a PTD often results in an accelerated death benefit. When 
modelling deaths, PTDs can be modelled as a proportion of deaths occurring, for example 
Alexander (op. cit.) reports specialists in earthquake injury as using a ratio of one death per 
three significant injuries.
7.4	 Segmenting	Death	Data	by	Income	Groups
This could give a better estimate of whether the deaths were insured and, if so, the 
likely size of the sum assured. For example, the majority of historical South African flood 
deaths have been residents of informal settlements, whereas an airliner disaster is likely to 
affect a wealthier sub-section of the population. Given the same death count for the two 
catastrophe types, an insurer is likely to have more and larger claims arising from the airliner 
crash.
7.5	 Group	Life	Policies
Modelling group life and individual policies separately could give more accurate 
results. Group life policies can lead to an accumulation of risk in a specific area or industry, 
which could materially increase the importance of some of the catastrophe types considered, 
for example, an industrial accident. If terrorism were to be modelled, these group life policies 
pose the largest risk. This is due to the concentration of lives, usually in high-value target 
areas in urban city centres.
7.6	 War	and	Terrorism	(incl.	Nuclear	and	Biological	Risks)
This should be included in further research. Terrorism may be one of the most 
difficult life catastrophe event types to quantify, due to the added human element. The 
method should give consideration to the current political climate as well as socio-economic 
and other relevant trends. Industry practice has been to rank potential targets by the terrorists’ 
“expected utility” (Woo, 2002). Utility may be influenced by the symbolic value of the target, 
economic damage or number of casualties.
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7.7 Heatwaves
The inclusion of heat waves as a mass mortality event could also be warranted. 
There are several international examples through history, the most memorable being the 
2003 European heat wave. Some sources have 70 000 deaths attributed to that event (see, for 
example, Robine et al. (2008) for further information).
7.8	 Other	Risks
Other risks that should be assessed include shipping disasters, arena/stadium-type 
disasters, meteorological catastrophes as well as some allowance for completely new and 
unanticipated types of catastrophes.
7.9	 Correlation	between	Catastrophes
This paper assumed independence between catastrophes. However, one could expect 
some positive correlation between events. For example, an earthquake giving rise to a 
tsunami that causes both mass floods and further accidents (as occurred in Fukushima in 
March 2011, when a tsunami disabled the cooling systems of nuclear reactors). The effects of 
such correlations could be investigated in further research.
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CEIOPS Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors
DME Department of Minerals and Energy
DPLG Department of Provincial and Local Government
ECDC European Centre for Disease Control and Prevention
ECDF Empirical cumulative distribution function
EIOPA European Institute and Occupational Pensions Authority
EU European Union
FSA Financial Services Authority
FSB Financial Services Board
ILO International Labour Organisation
LERF Large early release frequency
M Magnitude
NMDC National Disaster Management Centre
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development
PDF Probability density function
PSIF Public Safety Information Forum
PTD Permanent total disability
QIS5 The Fifth Quantitative Impact Study (CEIOPS)
RMS Risk Management Services
RSS Reactor Safety Study
SAA South African Airways
SCR Solvency capital requirement
UCS Union of Concerned Scientists
USNRC United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
VaR Value-at-Risk
WHO World Health Organization
